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Although cooperatives have long been a fixture of the world 
economy, the 2008 financial crisis sparked renewed interest in 
cooperatives as a democratic and sustainable alternative to conventional 
business forms, and the United Nations named 2012 the "International 
Year of [the] Cooperatives."1 This renewed enthusiasm for 
cooperatives has taken many forms, including the "Bank Transfer Day", 
also known as "Move Your Money" day, which led to an influx of new 
members at credits unions.2 For its part, Germany has not only been the 
1. See generally Julian B. Heron, Jr. & David B. Friedman, Retrospective: New 
Challenges for California Agriculture in World Export Markets, 1 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. 
REV. 1, 30 (1991) reprinted in 20 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 239, 268 (2011) (suggesting 
transnational agricultural cooperatives as a method of securing access to markets for 
Californian agricultural goods); U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS DIV. FOR Soc. PoL'Y 
& DEV., INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF COOPERATIVES 2012, available at 
http://social.un.org/coopsyear/uncoops.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
2. David Dayen, Move Your Money: Hundreds of Thousands of Transfers from Big 
Banks to Small in the Last Three Months, FIREDOGLAKE (Feb. 3, 2012, 7:35 AM), available 
at http:! /news.firedoglake.com/2012/02/03/move-your-money-hundreds-of-thousands-of-
transfers-from-big-banks-to-small-in-last-three-months/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). The 
effort led to over 5 million new members at credit unions and small banks. Id. 
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site of an economic boom in recent years3 but has also witnessed an 
exponential increase in the number of cooperatives being organized. 4 
The proliferation of renewable energy cooperatives has received the 
most sustained media attention, but agricultural, housing and even beer-
brewing cooperatives have been a part of this upsurge. 5 
While the upswing in cooperative development in Germany is 
notable in its own right, of even greater significance is the application of 
a new organizational model to cooperative projects, which both 
facilitates the growth of democratic enterprises and organizes them in 
cohesive networks.6 Pioneered by the Mietshauser Syndikat in over 
eighty established projects across Germany, the use of limited liability 
companies held jointly by the local residents and a larger network has 
proven both effective as an engine of growth and compatible with the 
democratic and constitutive ideals so closely identified with 
cooperatives.7 Notably, the organization is entirely democratic yet has 
discarded the standard cooperative model as too inflexible and 
overburdened by regulation to operate in an economy of scale. 8 
This note argues that the Mietshauser Syndikat model can be re-
purposed from the development of housing cooperatives to the 
development of networks of democratic enterprises in both civil and 
common law jurisdictions. Furthermore, it argues that the Mietshauser 
Syndikat model offers considerable advantages over conventional 
cooperatives because of its relative flexibility and ability to guarantee 
democratic management. As such, the Mietshauser Syndikat is better 
3. See Regierung sieht deutsche Wirtschafi vor starkem Aufschwung, DIE ZEIT (Oct. 23, 
2013 I :06 PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-10/wachstumsprognose-
deutsche-wirtschaft (last visited Nov 16, 2014). 
4. See Christiane Grefe, Und jetzt a/le - Gemeinsam Strom erzeugen, Hauser bauen, 
Banken besitzen: Genossenschafien haben wieder Zulauf, DIE ZEIT (Apr. 23, 2012, 7:51 
PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/2012/ 17 /Genossenschaften (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) 
( detailing the uptick in the number of cooperatives founded since the tum of the century). 
5. See generally id.; see also Nina Anika-Klotz, No Offence, liebe Biertrinker!, DIE 
ZEIT (July 25, 2013, I :47 PM), available at http://www.zeit.de/lebensart/essen-
trinken/2013-07/craft-beer-vagabund-brauerei (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Nadine 
Oberhuber, Mein Strom, dein Strom, DIE ZEIT at 28 (October 23, 2014), available at 
http://www.zeit.de/2014/44/emeuerbare-energien-strom-energiewende ( describing the 
advantages of investing in green energy cooperatives, described by experts as particularly 
stable entities with a bankruptcy rate ofO. l % ). 
6. See Anika Kreller, Vom Hausbesetzer zum Hausbesitzer, DIE ZEIT (June 25, 2012, 
3:39 PM), available at www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2012-06/immobilien-berlin (last visited Nov. 
15,2014). 
7. See Standortkarte, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/de/standortkarte/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
8. See Die Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/verbundbausteine/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
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suited to stimulating sustainable, democratic and equitable economic 
development than any other existing large-scale cooperative models. 
Thus, while other prominent cooperative enterprises sacrificed aspects 
of their democratic character in the name of economic necessity, the 
Mietshauser Syndikat has successfully persevered in maintaining direct, 
large-scale, consensus-based democracy. This model will make it 
possible to establish networks of democratic enterprises that are 
sustainable, geared for growth and operable in both common law and 
civil law jurisdictions. 
To evaluate and test the applicability of the Mietshauser Syndikat's 
model to other national contexts this note will consider two examples of 
cooperative development: the famed Mondragon Cooperative network 
based in Spain and the Evergreen Cooperatives in Cleveland, Ohio. 9 
For contextual purposes, Parts I through III will examine the legal and 
regulatory practices in Germany, Spain and the United States with 
regard to limited liability companies ("LLCs"), cooperatives and non-
profit entities. While the background on these three countries' law and 
regulation will inform the reader's understanding of each enterprise's 
development and operations, Spain and the U.S. will also serve as 
theoretical stand-ins for other civil and common law countries, 
illustrating the reproducibility of the Mietshauser Syndikat model in 
other jurisdictions. Part IV will then focus on the two established 
cooperative enterprises of scale, Mondragon and Evergreen, noting their 
prominent features and characteristics. Finally, Part V will examine the 
Mietshauser Syndikat, compare it with the enterprises discussed in Part 
IV and consider the applicability, merits and advantages of the 
Mietshauser Syndikat's model in the development of democratic 
enterprises. 
I. GERMAN LAW, REGULA TIO NS AND PRACTICES 
In Germany business entities are generally termed "stock 
corporations."10 Within this category there exist several corporate 
9. See generally MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/ENG.aspx?language=en-US (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); EVERGREEN 
COOPERATIVES, available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014); 
Field Study No. 2: The Evergreen Cooperatives, CAPITAL INST. , available at 
http://www.capitalinstitute.org/sites/capitalinstitute.org/files/docs/FS2-
Evergreen%20full%20article.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Evergreen Field 
Study] (independent study and evaluation of the Evergreen Cooperative); MIETSHAUSER 
SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
10. Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative Analysis 
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forms, the most common of which is the Limited Liability Company 
("GmbH"). 11 The GmbH is the single most important entity utilized by 
the Mietshauser Syndikat and serves, in democratized form, as a 
replacement for the cooperative. 12 Cooperatives are governed by 
substantially different laws and regulations, although the names and 
duties of officers are often identical to a GmbH's. 13 The principal non-
profit entity in Germany is the Verein (Association), which serves a 
range of charitable and service functions. 14 
A. The GmbH: The German LLC 
GmbHs are the single most common business entity in Germany. 15 
The process of founding a GmbH requires €25,000 in starting capital, 16 
half of which must be on hand at the time of registration, 17 an operating 
agreement for the GmbH, and identification of the company's officers. 18 
GmbHs with fewer than 500 employees are permitted to operate under a 
single manager, whereas larger GmbHs must employ the dual 
governance structure where a board of directors oversees management 
on behalf of the shareholders. 19 As such, GmbHs are especially suitable 
for smaller or closely-held enterprises. 20 However, there are also a 
number of so-called "GmbH giants," often local affiliates or 
of German and US. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INTL'L & COMP. LAW 555, 555 (2000) 
(German: "Aktiengesellschaften"). 
11. See id. at 556 n. l (German: Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung). 
12. See Die Verbundbausteine, supra note 8. 
13. See Gesets betreffend die Erwerbs-und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften 
[GENOSSENSCHAFTSGESETZ] [GenG] [Cooperatives Act], May I, 1889, BGBL. as amended, 
§ 9 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/geng/gesamt.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Cooperatives Act]. 
14. See Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ 
UNO FUR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (Aug. 18, 1896), as amended,§§ 21-22 (Ger.), available at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/BJNR001950896.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) 
[hereinafter Civil Code]. 
15. See Ingrid Lynn Lenhardt, The Corporate and Tax Advantages of a Limited 
Liability Company: A German Perspective, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 552-54 (1996); see 
Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung [GMBHG] [Limited Liability 
Companies Act], (Apr. 20, 1892), as amended (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/gmbhg/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) [hereinafter Limited Liability Companies 
Act]. 
16. See Limited Liability Companies Act§ 5 (Ger.). 
17. See id. § 7(2). 
18. See id. § 8. 
19. See Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 557-58 (smaller GmbHs may opt for dual 
governance if they so desire). 
20. See id. at 562 (the GmbH is also the entity of choice for sole proprietors and 
partnerships). 
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subsidiaries of foreign corporations. 21 
B. German Cooperatives 
The history of modern cooperatives in Germany dates to the 
Cooperative Act of 1889.22 Legal changes in 1933 and 1973 moved the 
Cooperative Law in the direction of increasingly limited liability, 
including cooperatives where members bore no liability whatsoever. 23 
In 2006, further amendments resolved issues concerning the 
management and supervisory boards, permitting, for example, one-
person management boards in cooperatives with few members.24 
German law distinguishes cooperatives from other business entities 
on three bases: cooperatives do not pursue "corporate" profit, instead 
seeking profit and advantage for their members;25 they are not closed in 
terms of membership, which may fluctuate; 26 and finally, their 
democratic administration. 27 Contemporary German legal scholars tend 
to place greater emphasis on the last aspect, which contrasts with the 
typical "top-down" structure of corporations. 28 
The Cooperative Law requires that every cooperative have a 
management board. 29 It also requires a supervisory board, on which at 
least three persons must serve without compensation. 30 Members of 
21. See id. at 553 (two examples noted are Bosch GmbH and IBM Deutschland 
GmbH). 
22. See Cooperatives Act (Ger.) (stating the date of issue as May 1, 1889). 
23. See Udo Kornblum, Das Weiterleben der Genossenschaft, IN RECHT, GERICHT, 
GENOSSENSCHAFT UND POLICEY: STUDIEN ZU GRUNDBEGRIFFEN DER GERMANISTISCHEN 
RECHTSHISTORIE, 168, 174 (1986) (noting the [West] German legislature's express intent to 
permit cooperatives without member liability); see also Christoph Bernhardt, Wir bauen 
eine neue Stadt - Im Verein gegen die Wohnungsnot, DIE ZEIT (June 25, 2012, 3:39 PM), 
available at http://www.zeit.de/2013/22/geschichte-baugenossenschaften-wohnen (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (detailing the genesis of housing cooperatives from the nineteenth 
century to the present). 
24. Cooperatives Act§§ 24, 36 (Ger.). 
25. Id. § 24(3). 
26. See Wolfgang Kohte, Die Genossenschaft- eine Rechtsform mit Zukunft? - neue 
Impulse aus Brussel fur eine alte Rechtsform, 12 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 905, 
906 (1991). 
27. See id.; Cooperatives Act§ I (Ger.). 
28. See Volker Beuthien, Die eingetragene Genossenschaft als verbundenes 
Unternehmen, in DAS GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT DER KONZERNE IM INTERNATIONALEN 
VERGLEICH, 133, 135 (1991) (contrasting the top-to-bottom 'command path' of conventional 
business entities with the collective, democratic decision-making process in cooperatives); 
Kornblum, supra note 23, at 168. 
29. Cooperatives Act§ 9 (Ger.). 
30. Id. §§ 9, 36. (German: "Aufsichtsrat"; cooperatives with under twenty members are 
allowed one-person management boards). 
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both boards must also be members of the cooperative. 31 Although 
recent amendments to the law have expanded supervisory and 
management board members' power to act on behalf of the cooperative, 
the General Assembly remains the main decision-making body of 
cooperatives. 32 Indeed, the law expressly prohibits investor vetoes of 
members' decisions. 33 
The Cooperative Law also specifies that the investment 
contributions made by members to obtain membership must comprise at 
least a tenth of the cooperative's total assets. 34 In keeping with the 
principle that cooperatives serve to benefit their members, the 
Cooperative Law provides for a default procedure in the distribution of 
profits that all cooperatives must follow absent an explicit procedure set 
out in the cooperative' s charter. 35 However, even where cooperatives 
develop their own procedures, profits are paid out to members in 
portions equal to their shares-cooperatives may regulate how profits 
are disbursed, but not the amount. 36 
The 1973 and 2006 amendments to the Cooperative Law have 
permitted the acquisition of more than one share by members, although 
the rule of "one man, one vote" still defines cooperative governance. 37 
A cooperative' s charter may even require members to purchase more 
than one share, but only if the requirement is enforced on an equal basis 
for all members. 38 Dissolution of a cooperative requires a three-quarters 
majority vote of its members. 39 
Probably the single most defining feature of the Cooperative Law 
in comparison to other countries is its placement of regulatory power in 
private, non-state hands.40 All cooperatives are required to join a 
Cooperative Auditing Association ("CAA"), which acts as a quasi-
governmental regulatory agency. 41 Cooperatives with less than 
31. Id.§ 9. 
32. Id. § 8(2). 
33. Id. ("the Charter may provide for ... the admittance of investing members [but] 
must insure through appropriate bylaws that investing members are in no instance able to 
overrule [the decision of] other members"). 
34. Cooperatives Act§ 7 (Ger.). 
35. See id. § 19 (for example, a cooperative ' s charter may provide that profits flow into 
financial reserves instead). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. § 7(a); see Kornblum, supra note 23 at 168 (cooperatives may also restrict the 
acquisition of additional shares in any way they see fit). 
38. Cooperatives Act§ 7(a) (Ger.). 
39. See id. § 78. 
40. See id. §§ 53-55. 
41. See id. § 54 (German: "Prtifungsverband"). 
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€2,000,000 in assets must submit to inspection every two years, while 
those with more undergo yearly inspections.42 This is a fairly invasive 
process in which an inspector from the CAA receives full access to 
ledgers, financial statements, financial instruments and even the 
cooperative' s goods and wares. 43 
C. German Non-Pro.fit Entities 
Non-profit entities typically take the form of registered or 
unregistered associations in Germany. 44 Within each category 
associations are further divided between for-profit and non-profit 
associations.45 Registered associations, as their name implies, are 
registered with a local court agency, which approves or rejects its 
charter.46 Unregistered associations may become active almost 
immediately without registration.47 Both registered and unregistered 
associations may acquire interests in LLCs, even as non-profits, 
although in practice local court agencies have been loathe to allow 
unregistered associations to do so.48 In all other respects, such as the 
liability of an association's officers, associations are generally treated 
like other corporate entities. 49 
II. SPANISH LAW, REGULA TIO NS, AND PRACTICES 
Spanish law provides for LLCs and the relevant laws are 
comparable to those of Germany and the U.S.50 By contrast, the 
42. Id.§ 53. 
43. Cooperatives Act§ 57 (Ger.). 
44. Civil Code §§ 21-22, 54 (Ger.) (German: "Verein"); see MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, 
HANDBUCH 5 (2013) (handbook of the Mietshauser Syndikat, on file with author) 
[hereinafter HANDBUCH]. 
45. See Civil Code §§ 21-22, 54 (Ger.) (non-profit associations enjoy several 
advantages, chief among them favorable tax treatment). 
46. Id. (German: "Amtsgericht"); see HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 5 (identifying 
language that is decisive in a local court agency's determination of whether an association is 
for-profit or not-for-profit). 
47. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 5. 
48. See id. at 5 (identifying language that is decisive in a local court agency's 
determination of whether an association is for-profit or not-for-profit). 
49. See Civil Code §§ 31-31 b (Ger.) (liability of an association for its representatives 
and personal liability of board members); Limited Liability Companies Act§§ 13, 15 (Ger.). 
50. See CODIGO DE COMERCIO [C. COM. 1889] [Commercial Code] art. 125, 145 
(Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1885-6627 (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014); Limited Liability Companies Act §§ 5-7 (Ger.); UNIFORM LTD. LtAB. Co. 
ACT (1994) (amended 2006), available at http: //www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ullca _ final_ 06rev. pdf (last visited Oct. 28, 2014 ). 
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Spanish Cooperative Law is much more flexible than its counterparts, 
providing for the organization of cooperatives in larger "second-degree" 
cooperatives and permitting legal entities to acquire interests in 
cooperatives.51 Spanish non-profit entities, like those in Germany and 
the U.S., are also permitted to acquire interests in other entities and may 
be organized democratically. 52 
A. The Sociedad de Responsabilidad Limitada: The Spanish LLC 
Limited liability companies in Spain are founded through 
execution of a deed in the presence of a public notary and registration 
with the Mercantile Registry. 53 Spanish law requires €3,000 starting 
capital and LLCs are not permitted to issue shares but instead divide 
their capital into "participation interests," which non-partner investors 
may acquire.54 LLC partners bear no personal liability for company 
debts and directors are liable solely to the partners and the holders of 
participation interests. 55 The partners and participation holders elect the 
directors and may remove them. 56 Other entities, whether businesses or 
non-profits, may acquire interests in Spanish LLCs. 57 
B. Spanish Cooperatives 
Cooperatives were not a prominent component of the Spanish 
economy until the second half of the 20th century. 58 The earliest modem 
legislation concerning cooperatives was the Associations Act of 1887 
and the Farm Unions Act of 1906, which provided a legal framework 
for agricultural cooperatives and led to the rapid proliferation of farm 
unions. 59 This process continued during the Second Republic60 and the 
51. Cooperative Law arts. 8, 12 (B.O.E. 1999, 27) (Spain), available at 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1999-15681 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). 
52. See id. art. 5(2). 
53. Commercial Code art. 125, 145 (Spain). 
54. See id. art. 125; Limited Liability Company Law art. 4 (B.O.E 1995, 2) (Spain), 
available at https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1995/03/24/pdfs/A09181-09206.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014) (the text of the law still lists the amount in pesetas, so the amount of 3,000 € 
is an approximation). 
55. Commercial Code arts. 127, 147 (Spain). 
56. See id. art. 125. 
57. Limited Liability Company Law art. 87 (Spain) (defining when an LLC is 
considered "dominant" in relation to another). 
58. See Juan Francisco Julia Igual & Sergio Mari Vidal, Farm Cooperatives and the 
Social Economy: The Case of Spain, 30 J. RURAL COOPERATION 119, 121-22 (2002), 
available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/handle/59573 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
59. See id. at 121-22; WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE, MAKING 
MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX 18-19 
(2d ed. 1991) (noting that the first recorded consumer cooperative was in 1880, preceding 
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Spanish Civil War, only to be abruptly altered following the victory of 
the Falangistas under Francisco Franco.61 Nevertheless, the role of 
cooperatives in the Spanish economy continued to grow and during the 
transitional years of the Third Republic, two legislative acts62 shifted the 
focus to actively fostering business development. 63 
The prominence of cooperatives in Spain's economy is largely due 
to the Mondragon Cooperatives, founded in 1956.64 This initial worker-
owned and -managed enterprise flowered into an extensive and highly 
variegated cooperative network, discussed in detail below. 65 In terms of 
its influence on the Spanish economy, Mondragon demonstrated that 
worker cooperatives were economically viable and could serve as 
engines of prosperity. 66 As an example of cooperatives' present role in 
the Spanish economy, at the dawn of this century in the agricultural 
sector alone there were nearly 4,000 cooperatives with over a million 
members.67 
Spanish cooperatives are governed by the country's Cooperative 
Law, although the Commercial Code also applies under certain 
circumstances. 68 The Cooperative Act provides for two types of 
cooperatives: first- and second-degree cooperatives. 69 A first-degree 
the Cooperative Act by some seven years). 
60. See Igual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 122 (the 1931 Cooperatives Act also provided 
for a cooperative registry maintained by the Ministry of Labor that would give cooperatives 
legal standing); WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 18-21. 
61. See George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia, LIBCOM.ORG 3-4 (1938), available at 
http://libcom.org/files/Homage%20to%20Catalonia%20-%20George%200rwell.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (containing the famed author's first-hand account of the economic 
changes undertaken during the Spanish Civil War); see also Igual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 
122 (the 1942 Cooperatives Act enabled the official trade union to veto candidates in 
cooperative elections). 
62. The Cooperatives General Act of 1974 and the Regulations for Cooperative 
Societies, passed in 1978. See lgual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 122. 
63. See id. at 122. 
64. See MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/history/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (relating 
the significant early dates in the cooperatives' development). 
65. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 32-35. 
66. See id. at 46-48; Christopher S. Axworthy, Worker Co-Operatives in Mondragon, 
the UK. and France: Some Reflections, UNIVER. SASKATCHEWAN CENTRE FOR THE STUDY 
OF Co-OPERATIVES: OCCASIONAL PAPERS 3 (1985). 
67. lgual & Vidal, supra note 58, at 123. Moreover, in 1996 agricultural cooperatives 
were responsible for 45% of Spain's fruit produce, 15% of vegetable produce, 27% of milk 
production and 20% of its cereal production. Id. at 125. 
68. Cooperatives Law art. 1 (Spain) ("[L]as cooperativas de producci6n ... quedaran 
sujetas a las disposiciones de este C6digo cuando se dedicaren a actos de comercio extrafios 
a la mutalidad."). 
69. See id. arts. 1, 7-8, 12. 
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cooperative is constituted by at least three persons (natural, juridical or 
both), while a second-degree cooperative consists of two or more 
cooperatives organized in a network. 7° Founding both types requires 
execution of a public deed registered with the local Registry of 
Cooperatives. 71 The deed must contain a number of key pieces of 
information, including by-laws, identification of members, as well as 
evidence that they have invested the funds necessary to become 
members.72 
Under the Spanish Cooperative Act, all members of the 
cooperative have the right to participate in the decision-making process, 
although it permits unequal influence on the basis of unequal 
investment. 73 A member of a first-degree cooperative may not obtain 
more than a third of the voting share. 74 Cooperatives may also establish 
special voting regimes for certain situations, e.g. total voting equality 
among members when deciding whether to dissolve. 75 To alter the 
cooperatives by-laws, dissolve or merge with another cooperative, or 
convert the cooperative into another entity, a two-thirds majority of 
votes is required by law. 76 
With regard to second-degree cooperatives, legal entities other than 
cooperatives may attain membership. 77 Non-cooperative entities may 
not make up more than 45% of the membership, although in contrast to 
first-degree cooperatives member entities are permitted to acquire more 
than a 30% capital interest in the second-degree cooperative.78 
However, the relationship between first- and second-degree 
cooperatives is not merely constitutive under Spanish law, but is instead 
conceived as a hierarchical relationship in which the second-degree 
cooperative commands and controls the first-degree cooperative.79 
70. See id. arts. 8, 12. 
71 . See id. art. 7 (Spanish: "Registro de Sociedades Cooperativas"). 
72. Id. art. 10; see also FERNANDO POMBO, DOING BUSINESS IN SPAIN § 12.04[2] (2012). 
73. Cooperative Law art. 1, 26 (Spain). 
74. See id. art. 26 ("[L]os Estatutos fijaran con claridad los criterios de 
proporcionalidad, sin que el numero de votos de un socio pueda ser superior al tercio de los 
votos totales de la cooperativa"). 
75. See id. art. 26(7) ("[L]os Estatutos deberan regular los supuestos en que sera 
imperativo el voto igualitario"). 
76. Id. art. 28. 
77. See id. art. 77 ("Tambien pueden integrarse en calidad de socios otras personas 
juridicas, publicas o privadas y empresarios individuales, hasta un maximo del cuarenta y 
cinco por ciento del total de los socios"). 
78. See Cooperative Law art. 77 (Spain). 
79. See id. art. 17, 78( l ). 
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C. Spanish Non-Profit Entities 
The standard non-profit entity in Spain is the non-profit 
association. 80 Spanish non-profit associations must show at the time of 
incorporation that they have a social purpose, e.g. the defense of human 
rights, the promotion of volunteerism or advancing the "social 
economy."81 Such associations must use at least 70% of their corporate 
income for that stated purpose. 82 Although formally subject to 
corporate taxes, a number of types of income are exempt, including 
donations and any dividends from interests in other entities. 83 The 
process of incorporation is largely identical to that of other corporate 
entities except that the entity is entered into a separate registry for such 
non-profit associations. 84 
III. U.S. LAW, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 
In the Republic's early history, corporations were relatively 
unimportant, there being only 317 at the dawn of the 19th century by one 
count.85 This changed rapidly, however, and by the end of the 19th 
century the U.S. boasted some of the largest and most successful 
corporations in the world. 86 This development has continued into the 
present, with the LLC representing a recent addition to U.S. business 
entities.87 As in Europe, U.S. cooperatives can trace their roots back to 
early 1800s but did not attain any economic significance until the 20th 
century. 88 In contrast to their counterparts, however, worker 
80. Law on the Fiscal Regime for Non-Profit Entities and Charitable Incentives, 
Declaration of Motives II (B.O.E. 2002, 49) (Spain), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) 
(Spanish: "entidad sin fines lucrativos"). 
81. See id. art. 3(1) ("de fomenta de la economia social"). 
82. See id. art. 3(2). 
83. See id. art. 6(2) ("Estan exentas ... los dividendos y participaciones en beneficios de 
sociedades"). 
84. See id. art. 3(7). 
85. Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 300 (1990). 
86. See MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN 
CAPITALISTS 1861-1901, at 253-64, 284-87 (Transaction Publishers 2011) (1934). This 
classic of American history offers a particular focus on the titans of industry that helped 
make the U.S. "in very short order the premier industrial nation of the world." Id. at 254. 
87. Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT (1994) (amended 2006), available at 
http://www. uni formlaws. org/shared/ docs/limited%20 liabi l it)'°/o20company/ul lea_ final_ 06re 
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
88. See Christine A. Varney, The Capper-Volstead, Agricultural Cooperatives and 
Antitrust Immunity, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1-3 (Dec. 2010), available at 
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cooperatives are often defined narrowly, precluding the acquisition of 
an interest by another legal entity, and state laws often make no 
provision for a cooperative network.89 U.S. non-profits generally enjoy 
the same powers as their European counterparts, including the 
acquisition of interests in business entities and determination of their 
own structure and by-laws.90 
A. US. Limited Liability Companies 
State legislatures have been the primary agents in the creation and 
spread of the LLC as a legal entity.91 The first state to introduce this 
particular form was Wyoming in 1977 but by the time the Uniform Law 
Commission promulgated its Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
in 1996 a majority of state legislatures had provided for LLCs. 92 The 
LLC is meant to provide the "pass-through" tax advantages of a 
partnership ( from which the form is derived) and the liability 
advantages of a corporation. 93 
The federal structure of the United States affords a high degree of 
sovereignty to individual states such that the regulation of LLCs across 
the country is subject to variation.94 As a result, the focus here will be 
on federal regulation and those requirements common to most, if not all, 
states so as to offer a general impression of LLC formation and 
regulation in the U.S.95 
Limited Liability Companies are formed by filing articles of 
organization, often with the local secretary of state. 96 The articles of 
organization must indicate the name of the LLC, its location and 
http://www.americanbar.org/ content/ dam/ aba/pub lishing/ antitrust_ source/Dec I O _ Varney 12 
_21.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (summarizing the early growth of 
agricultural cooperatives and attendant legislation). 
89. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A, § 7 (West 2014). 
90. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2014). 
91. See Prefatory Note, UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT 1 (1994) (amended 2006), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ 
ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
92. See id. at 2. 
93. See id. at 1-6. 
94. See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence 
favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1800-02, 1812-17 
(2002) (noting the variety and effect of state anti-takeover statutes in retaining in-state 
corporations and attracting out-of-state corporations). 
95. The Uniform Law Commission's revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
will figure prominently here. See UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. AcT (1994) (amended 2006), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability%20company/ 
ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
96. See id. § 201. 
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identify stakeholders.97 Many state laws set as a default equal 
distributions by the LLC to its members but all permit unequal 
distribution schemes by agreement. 98 An LLC is prohibited from 
making distributions that would hinder its ability to satisfy outstanding 
debts. 99 The Uniform Act also provides that an LLC is a member-
managed entity unless the operating agreement explicitly provides 
otherwise. 100 While state taxation of Limited Liability Companies 
vary, 101 the IRS will generally treat LLC members as partners and 
affords them a partnership's income "pass-through" advantage, 
preventing the "double-taxation" that standard corporations 
experience. 102 
B. U.S. Cooperatives 
The earliest U.S. cooperatives were developed in the agricultural 
sector and continued to increase in influence until by the mid-20th 
century cooperatives were mainstays of farming, husbandry and food-
production. 103 These were the first cooperatives to receive any 
legislative treatment at the federal or state levels, notably the provisions 
of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 that immunized agricultural 
cooperatives from anti-trust legislation. 104 Another common example is 
the cooperative credit union, which was introduced to the United States 
from Germany via Quebec, with the first cooperative credit union in the 
U.S. opening its doors in Manchester, New Hampshire in 1908. 105 Over 
97. See id. (the Uniform Act provides for the formation of an LLC even when no 
members are yet named). 
98. See id. § 405 . 
99. See id. 
100. See UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§ 407 (1994) (amended 2006), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability<>/o20company/ullca _ final_ 06re 
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (this section also contains detailed provisions for the 
appointment and removal of managers, as well as the effects of dissociating a member who 
is also a manager). 
101. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Limited-Liability-
Company-LLC (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
102. See id. (single-member LLCs are deemed entities that are not separate from the 
owner for income tax, but separate for employment and some excise taxes). 
103. See Varney, supra note 88, at 1. 
104. See id. at 1, 4; 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92 (2010) (providing for administrative action 
against cooperatives that restrain trade in the place of judicial action). Pending class action 
suits may re-define some cooperative's immunity to anti-trust actions. See In re Fresh & 
Process Potatoes Antitrust Litigation, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106666, 6-7 (D. Idaho July 27, 
2012). 
105. See WENDELL V. FOUNTAIN, THE NEW EMERGING CREDIT UNION WORLD: THEORY, 
PROCESS, PRACTICE CASES & APPLICATION 9 (2d Edition 2012). An excellent summary of 
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the next decades credit unions spread across the country, culminating in 
the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, a national regimen for chartering 
and supervising credit unions. 106 Workers' cooperatives, by contrast, 
long operated without specific statutory provision until the advent of 
Massachusetts' General Law 157A in 1982. 107 
As in Europe, regulations concerning cooperatives followed their 
spread through the United States. 108 Among the states there is some 
variation: some address only agricultural cooperatives and treat others 
more or less the same as other corporate entities, 109 but a few have 
established specific legal regimens for cooperatives. 110 Incorporation of 
a cooperative mirrors that of a corporation in many respects: the 
prospective founders file a certificate of incorporation with the relevant 
agency, usually the secretary of state, which includes all essential 
information concerning contact information, the identity of the interest-
holders, whether and in what amounts stock will be offered, etc. 111 
the early genesis of credit unions is available from the NATIONAL CREDIT UNION 
ADMINISTRATION, available at http://www.ncua.gov/about/history/Pages/CUHistory.aspx 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014). La Caisse Populaire, Ste-Marie is still an active credit union in 
Manchester, NH, available at http://www.stmarysbank.com/about-st-marys-bank/our-
history.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
106. Specifically, the Federal Credit Union Act provided for the creation of the 
National Credit Union Administration with the power to charter credit unions, collect fees, 
provide share insurance for members and ensure credit unions' compliance with regulatory 
directives. Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1752a, 1755, 1781, 1785, 
1790d (2013). 
107. See David Ellerman & Peter Pitegoff, The Democratic Corporation: The New 
Worker Cooperative Statute in Massachusetts, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 441, 442-
43 (1983). 
108. See Sean Flynn, A Short History of Cooperative Law and Regulation Reform in 
Developing Countries, in U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ENABLING 
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES FOR LEGAL REFORM 43 (2006) (noting that 
cooperatives in North America and Europe developed in a bottom-up fashion and that "laws 
generally followed and recognized the initial development of a cooperative sector"). 
109. This has sometimes forced would-be cooperators to form a corporation with 
altered by-laws. MGL J 57a, the Massachusetts Statute for Employee Cooperative 
Corporations, AM. COOPERATIVE WORKER (Jan. 29, 2011, 10:57 AM), available at 
http://www.american.coop/node/275 (last visited Oct. 28, 2014); see Lynn Pitman, Limited 
Cooperative Association Statutes: An Update 2 (Univ. of Wis. Ctr. for Coops., Staff Paper 
No. 7, April 2008). 
110. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-111 to -118 (2013); North Carolina Co-op Law 
Information, Co-OP LA w .ORG, available at 
http://www.cooplaw.org/statebystate/northcarolina/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (commenting 
on the North Carolina Cooperative Associations Statute); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A 
(West 1982). 
111. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 155 (West 2004) (general corporate law providing 
for incorporation of all "business corporations"); N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 54-113 (last amended 
1985); N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW arts. 2, § 11, 15 (McKinney 2013) (indicating the required 
contents of the certificate and filing with the secretary of state). 
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However, some states provide for particular protections for 
cooperatives, a common one being prohibitions on the use of the word 
"cooperative" in the name of any entity not conforming with the 
statutory definition. 112 Some states also require that only members have 
the power to amend a cooperative's by-laws, excluding non-member 
stockholders from management decisions. 113 Furthermore, states that 
have specific provisions for workers cooperatives often preclude legal 
entities from acquiring a voting share in the enterprise. 114 
Under federal tax law cooperatives are categorized as "Farmers' 
Tax Exempt Cooperatives" or "Non-Exempt Cooperatives," meaning 
that non-agricultural cooperatives must pay corporate income tax. 115 
However, like LLCs, cooperatives are permitted to "pass through" 
corporate income to their members without paying corporate income 
tax. 116 State taxation can vary but cooperatives are usually taxed at the 
same rate as other corporate entities. 117 Yet, in some cases, states tack 
closely to federal law, exempting some types of cooperatives entirely. 11 8 
C. U.S. Non-Profit Entities 
Although non-profits are incorporated at the state level, Federal 
law plays an outsized role in their foundation and operation because 
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157, § 8 (West 2014) (providing that any corporate 
entity using the word "co-operative" that is not structured in accordance with the statutory 
requirements for cooperatives "shall forfeit to the commonwealth not more than ten dollars 
for every day ... such name or title is so used" and potentially face injunctions against 
continued operation); N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2014) (requiring 
cooperatives to use the word "cooperative" in their names). 
113. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 157A, § 7 (West 2014) ("No capital stock other 
than membership shares shall be given voting power in an employee cooperative."); N.H. 
Rev. STAT. ANN. § 301-A:1 (2014) (defining consumer cooperatives as entities in which 
"each member has one and only one vote" and in which "voting by proxy is prohibited."). 
114. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 157A, § 7 (West 2014). 
115. See Instructions for Form 1120-C, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 7 (2013), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/il 120c.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); 26 
U.S.C. § 521 (2004). 
116. See 26 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (2014) (this income is termed "patronage"). 
117. For example, North Carolina taxes cooperatives at the same rate as other corporate 
entities, although it applies federal deductions for patronage dividends. Tax Rate and Basis 
for the Tax, N.C. DEP'T REVENUE, available at 
http://www.domc.com/taxes/corporate/rate.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Form CD-418, 
N.C. DEP'T REVENUE, available at http://www.domc.com/downloads/cd418.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014). 
118. See Corporate Excise Tax, MASS. DEP'T REVENU E, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/dor/businesses/current-tax-info/guide-to-employer-tax-
obligations/business-income-taxes/corporations/corporate-excise-tax.html (last visited Nov. 
16, 2014) ( exempting from income tax all corporations organized under Section 501 of the 
Internal Revenue Code, including some cooperative corporations). 
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they are subject to a special federal tax regimen. 119 As such, most non-
profit entities are identified by their exemption category under the U.S. 
Code, e.g. 501(c)(3), 501(c)(6), etc. 120 The statute covers a variety of 
entities, including civic leagues, business leagues, and mutual insurance 
funds, among others. 121 
If an organization qualifies as a 501 ( c) entity and receives approval 
by the IRS, its corporate income is generally tax-exempt. 122 This status 
is subject to section 503(b ), which lists prohibited transactions resulting 
in denial of tax-exempt status, including overcompensation for personal 
services or making the organization's services available on a 
preferential basis. 123 Income from trade or business unrelated to the 
entity's purpose remains taxable. 124 Important for this article is that 
Federal tax law does not distinguish between tax-exempt entities on the 
basis of their form of organization, nor does it prescribe any particular 
organizational format. 125 
IV. ESTABLISHED LARGE-SCALE COOPERATIVE MODELS: 
MONDRAGON AND EVERGREEN 
A. The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation 
The Mondragon Cooperative Corporation grew out of a vocational 
school founded by the Catholic priest Jose Maria Arizmendiarrieta in 
the town of Mondragon in the Basque region of Spain. 126 A number of 
Arizmendiarrieta's students, who had moved on to positions in private 
enterprises, were dissatisfied with the stratified and adversarial 
environment in which they were employed. 127 After unsuccessful 
efforts to convince company managers and government officials to 
permit worker ownership of enterprises, they turned to their former 
teacher for advice. 128 
119. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2014). 
120. See id. 
121. See id. 
122. See id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2014); 26 U.S.C. § 503 (2014). 
123. See 26 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2014). 
124. See 26 U.S.C. § 513(a) (2014). 
125. See 26 U.S.C. § 503 (2014). 
126. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 28-31. 
127. See id. at 32. 
128. See id. at 33; Fernando Molina, The Spirituality of Economics: Historical Roots of 
Mondragon, 1940-1974, in BASQUE COOPERATIVISM 13, 20 (Baleren Bakaikoa & Eneka 
Albizu eds., 2011) (relating police suspicion of Arizmendiarrieta, resulting in interference 
even with Catholic Youth pilgrimages organized by the priest). 
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Arizmendiarrieta and the small group of students chose to form 
their own cooperative enterprise and, after prodigious community fund-
raising and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles, the five students founded 
Ulgor and obtained a license to produce home appliances. 129 From 1956 
to 1959 the number of "worker-shareholders" increased from 10 to 
143. 130 However, the defining act that set the Mondragon project on the 
path to success was the founding of the "Caja Laboral Popular" in 1959, 
a cooperative banking institution founded specifically to finance the 
foundation and operation of worker cooperatives. 131 With the help of 
credit extended by this institution, dozens of new worker cooperatives 
were established during the 1960s. 132 The Mondragon Cooperative 
Corporation continued to grow at a steady pace, numbering 160 
cooperatives with 19,000 members by 1985. 133 
At present the Mondragon group includes 289 enterprises with 
over 80,000 employees. 134 The Mondragon Corporation as a whole is a 
highly centralized organization, 135 with several intermediary layers 
between the individual cooperatives and the Caja Laboral. 136 For ease 
of understanding, the rest of this section moves from the 'bottom' of the 
hierarchy ( at the level of the individual cooperative) to the 'top' ( at the 
level of the Caja Laboral). 
1. Basic Cooperative Structure 
The individual cooperatives have their own internal governance 
structure, in which the General Assembly of all cooperative members is 
the highest decision-making organ. 137 The General Assembly elects the 
Governing Council, which acts as a Board of Directors. 138 The 
129. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 34; Molina, supra note 128, at 23. 
130. Molina, supra note 128, at 23. 
131. Id. at 23-24. 
132. Id. at 24. 
133. Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3. 
134. MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/eng/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting that Mondragon enterprises are 
present on five continents, including numerous branches in North and South America). 
135. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 11. 
136. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 36, 59-61. 
137. Id. at 35 (Spanish: "Asemblea General"); Governance - Organization, 
MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/eng/about-us/governance/organization/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014). 
138. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 35-37 (Spanish: "Junta Rectora"); see 
Governance Organization, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at 
http://www. mondragon-corporation. com/ eng/ about-us/ governance/ organization/ (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2014) (contrasting boards of directors at other private firms to the Governing 
Council, made up exclusively of member-employees of the cooperative). 
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Governing Council also appoints the manager of the cooperative and 
oversees their activities. 139 All cooperatives also have an Audit 
Committee, which monitors the finances of the enterprise, a 
Management Council consisting of a cooperative' s manager and 
department heads, and the Social Council, which serves as an ersatz 
union, advising the Management and Governing Councils on subjects as 
varied as compensation plans, working conditions and employment 
decisions. 140 These councils facilitate the operations of the cooperative 
while also keeping one another in check. 141 
2. Intermediate Organizations & "Second-Degree Co-operatives" 
Within the Mondragon group individual cooperatives are organized 
in second-degree cooperatives. 142 Long-standing examples include the 
Caja Laboral Popular (the group's financial institution), Iker/an 
(research) and Lagun Aro (social and medical services), but there are 
also other industrial or regional organizations. 143 Formally, the 
governing structure of these second-degree cooperatives mirrors that of 
the individual cooperatives: each cooperative has a single, equal vote 
and the cooperatives elect a Governing Council, which appoints the 
General Management144 that coordinates commercial policies. 145 One 
significant difference is that persons employed directly in the second-
degree organization are also considered members of that cooperative 
and have a right to elect delegates to represent their interests. 146 
139. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 37 (supporting both managers and 
members of the Governing Council are subject to term limits). 
140. See id. at 39-40 (discussing that while the General Council is elected at-large, the 
constitution of the Social Council follows a different procedure, one designed to ensure that 
it is not dominated by managers or the Governing Council: First, members of the Social 
Council are elected from within the departments of the cooperative; second, any member of 
the Governing Council drawing the lowest pay grade is automatically a member of the 
Social Council, which is meant to ensure that less-skilled or newer members are not unduly 
disadvantaged). Social Council, which is meant to ensure that less-skilled or newer 
members are not unduly disadvantaged. Id. 
141. See id. at 41 (describing how, if a serious disagreement arises between the Social 
Council and the Governing Council, the former may refer the issue to the General Assembly 
for all cooperative members to decide). 
142. See id. at 59-60. I have chosen to use the term "second-degree cooperative" 
because it is the most direct translation from the Spanish term and is common in both the 
relevant laws and in most scholarly works. See id. 
143. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3 (explaining the individual cooperatives are also 
linked to Eroski, the consumers' cooperative). 
144. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 60 (Spanish: "direcci6n general"). 
145. See id. at 60. 
146. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3 (this includes the Caja Laboral, discussed in 
greater detail in the next section). 
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Another is that the second-degree cooperative management both enjoys 
significant latitude in directing the actions of member cooperatives and 
is largely insulated from the individual cooperatives' control. 147 
Second-degree cooperatives also pool profits and losses across their 
members and facilitate labor transfers among cooperatives, reducing 
redundancies or expanding workforces as needed. 148 
3. The Caja Laboral Popular as a Managing Entity 
In theory, all second-degree cooperatives enjoy equal standing, but 
in practice the Caja Laboral Popular is the nerve center of Mondragon, 
holding member equity, managing savings accounts and making loans 
to member cooperatives. 149 Although nominally just the Mondragon 
"bank," the Caja wields considerable influence through its 
"Entrepreneurial Division," which controls the expansion and 
development of the entire group. 150 The Caja is headed by a governing 
council of twelve members, eight drawn from the individual 
cooperatives and four from Caja employees. 151 The representatives 
from the cooperatives are usually top management figures from the 
larger and more influential enterprises. 152 
The Caja's Entrepreneurial Division assesses all proposals for new 
cooperatives, which take the form of loan applications by the 
prospective cooperative members to the Caja. 153 If the Caja deems the 
project a worthy addition to the group, the new cooperative enters into a 
"contract of association." 154 This contract not only governs the 
cooperative's relationship with the Mondragon group but also 
prescribes a specific organizational framework. 155 For example, the 
contract mandates democratic control by cooperative members and lays 
out the procedures for making decisions. 156 The cooperative is barred 
from discriminating on the basis of political association, religion or 
gender and obligated to stay under a maximum ratio of non-member to 
147. Cooperative Law art. 17, 78(1) (Spain). 
148. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 61. 
149. See id. at 52. 
150. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 3; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69. 
151. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 68. 
152. See id. at 68 (quoting a conversation with then-chairman of the Caja, Alfonso 
Gorrofiogoitia, as indicating that the "top industrial leaders of the complex ... usually 
dominate the council"). 
153. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 5. 
154. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69. 
155. See id. at 36, 69 (referring to the chart on page 36 that represents the typical 
structure of a Mondragon cooperative). 
156. See id. at 69-70. 
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member employees. 157 The contract of association compels the 
cooperative to submit to audits every four years and to maintain a two-
to-one ratio in capital reserves versus borrowed capital. 158 
The contract of association also grants the Caja considerable power 
to intervene in the internal affairs of individual cooperatives. 159 All 
Mondragon cooperatives must deposit a portion of their surplus income 
with the Caja, enabling it to offer loans to prospective cooperatives at 
better rates. 160 If a cooperative fails to make loan payments or fulfill 
any of its obligations under the contract of association, the Caja may 
intervene directly, even appointing a manager on its own authority. 161 
While at times essential to ensuring the financial health and stability of 
the Mondragon group as a whole, such intrusive power suggests that the 
formally democratic Mondragon structure is tempered by a heavy dose 
of patemalism. 162 Furthermore, descriptions of the Caja's working 
culture indicate that many Caja employees treat Mondragon as a 
business that happens to consist of cooperatives, rather than a group of 
cooperatives doing business. 163 
B. The Evergreen Cooperatives 
The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation ("ECC") is the product of 
an effort by Cleveland area institutions to create sustainable living-wage 
jobs in low-income areas. 164 In 2009 the first two cooperatives, 
157. See id. at 69-70 (noting that in the 1980s non-members were not permitted to 
make up more than 10% of a cooperative's workforce. With the rapid expansion of 
Mondragon since 1992, this principle has given way to greater numbers of non-member 
employees, the bulk of which are located outside the Basque country); see Co-operative 
Experience - FAQs - How Many of Your Employees are Cooperative Members and How 
Many are Not?, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting that 
the company's figures put the global proportion of member-employees at about 33%, 
although a plan for extending membership to all Eroski employees foresees 75% global 
membership within three years). 
158. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 70. 
159. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 179-80. 
160. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6. 
161. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 178-81. 
162. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 7, 11-12 (noting that the attitude and bearing 
among Caja employees "was aloof and [they] appeared not to be part of the workforce." He 
also noted that Caja employees referred to other cooperative workers "as being uneducated, 
glad of a job, not very knowledg[ e ]able about the business of their co-operatives, even [as] 
peasants."). 
163. See id. at 7; WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 178-81 (demonstrating that the 
Intervention Department, which oversees the restructuring and management of cooperatives 
in financial distress, is a salient example of the technocratic character of the Caja). 
164. See The Evergreen Cooperatives Story, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), 
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Evergreen Cooperative Laundry and Ohio Cooperative Solar, opened 
for business. 165 Green City Growers, the largest urban hydroponic food 
production greenhouse in the U.S., began operations in 2011 and made 
its first harvest in early 2013. 166 The ECC acts as a "holding company" 
that manages the cooperatives and guides business development, with a 
long-term goal of creating "a robust network" of enterprises that 
emphasizes environmental sustainability and "green collar" jobs. 167 
During the planning leading up to the foundation of the ECC, 
representatives from the participating institutions visited Mondragon 
cooperatives in Spain and actively adopted a number of its 
organizational aspects. 168 The single greatest similarity is the presence 
of an "umbrella organization, modeled on Mondragon's [Caja Laboral], 
to be the keeper of its 'vision' and a source of continuity for all of its 
cooperative enterprises."169 The following description of the ECC's 
structure will start at the top and move down to the ground-level 
organizations. 
1. The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation 
A fifteen person Board of Directors governs the ECC and includes 
representatives from the founding "anchor institution[ s,]" investors and 
representatives from the individual cooperatives. 170 Parallel to the ECC 
and answering to the Board of Directors are an Executive Committee 
and an Audit and Finance Credit Committee. 171 
Directly under the ECC are the Evergreen Cooperative 
Development Fund, the Evergreen Land Trust, the Evergreen Business 
Services LLC and the cooperatives themselves. 172 The ECC is the sole 
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/evergreen-story/ (last visited Oct. 23, 
2014) (noting the institutions include the Cleveland Foundation, local hospitals, Case 
Western Reserve University and the city government); see also Sara Tonnesen, Note, 
Stronger Together: Worker Cooperatives as a Community Economic Development Strategy, 
20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 187, 195 (2012). 
165. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 7. 
166. See id.; see also Green City Growers Cooperative: The Third Evergreen Company 
is Open for Business!, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (Feb. 28, 2013), available at 
http://evergreencooperatives.com/2013/02/green-city-growers-cooperative-the-third-
evergreen-company-is-open-for-business/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
167. See Vision & Broad Goals, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at 
http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/mission-goals-and-principles/ (last visited Oct. 24, 
2014). 
168. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 6. 
169. See id. 
170. See id. at 14. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. 
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member of the Evergreen Cooperative Development Fund, whose 
director belongs to the ECC management staff. 173 The ECC also has 
sole control over the Evergreen Land Trust, whose aim is the 
acquisition of "logistically advantageous sites for future enterprises" 
and the preservation of manageable start-up costs for new businesses. 174 
The Evergreen Business Services LLC is also controlled directly by the 
ECC, focusing on "driving revenue, profitability, and new business 
growth through existing and new Evergreen related enterprises."175 
None of these LLCs are cooperatives and there is no provision for the 
representation of these entities' employees on the ECC board of 
directors. 176 The ECC also has direct representation in each individual 
cooperative as well as a 20% stake in the enterprise. 177 In contrast to 
Mondragon, the ECC currently appoints managers for the individual 
cooperatives. 178 
2. The Structure of the Individual Evergreen Cooperatives 
The individual cooperatives, currently three in number, 179 were 
conceived as democratic institutions. 180 Enfranchisement comes with 
full membership, which requires acceptance by the majority of current 
members and then the purchase, in installments, of an equal share in the 
cooperative. 181 However, this represents the extent of the public 
information concerning the individual cooperatives' govemmg 
173. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14; see also Structure & Leadership, 
EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/ 
about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014 ). 
174. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 17. 
175. Businesses - Evergreen Business Services, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), 
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/businesses/ evergreen-business-services/ (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2014 ). 
176. See generally Structure & Leadership, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), 
available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 
24, 2014). 
177. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14. 
178. See Structure & Leadership, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES (2012), available at 
http://evergreencooperatives.com/about/structure-leadership/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) 
( describing that the managers of the three cooperatives are staff employed directly by the 
ECC). 
179. Id. (Evergreen Cooperative Laundry, Evergreen Energy Solutions and Green City 
Growers Cooperative). 
180. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 22. 
181. See Introduction to the Evergreen Cooperatives 2.0, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES 
(Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/201 l/10/new-video-
introduction-to-the-evergreen-cooperatives-2-0/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (promotional 
video produced by the Evergreen Cooperatives presenting the ECC model). 
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structure. 182 
The ECC has published no information regarding the ratio of 
member to non-member employees, although the stated goal of the 
organization is to rapidly increase both the number of employees and 
members. 183 In its publications and presentations, the ECC has been 
silent concerning the cooperatives' governance, by-laws and decision-
making process. 184 This contrasts sharply with its general affirmations 
of workplace democracy, which figure prominently in its public 
message. 185 The ECC's vagueness about the implementation of 
democratic management is especially odd given its willingness to 
regularly present business and accounting information to the public. 186 
Financial transparency is itself both welcome and necessary, given that 
the ECC is funded and continues to be guided by several large partner 
organizations. 187 Yet, a significant part of the ECC' s appeal is that it 
envisions not only job creation but also democratic economic 
development. 188 The dearth of information on this subject can only 
stimulate speculation and provoke questions as to the extent of the 
ECC 's commitment to workplace democracy. 189 
182. See id. 
183. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 8 (the Evergreen Laundry employed 21 
people as of 2011 but aims to employ 50 once it reached full operational capacity). 
184. The only specific detail yielded in the various ECC materials was the statement by 
one employee-owner that cooperative members voted on whether to grant membership to a 
probational employee. Introduction to the Evergreen Cooperatives 2.0, EVERGREEN 
COOPERATIVES (Oct. 15, 2011), available at http://evergreencooperatives.com/201 l/10/new-
video-introduction-to-the-evergreen-cooperatives-2-0/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014). 
185. Id.; Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 22 (Ted Howard, co-founder of the 
Democracy Collaborative, one of the principal institutions involved in the development of 
the ECC: "The way our economic system works today at all levels, you go to work and hang 
your democratic rights at the door. . . . The Evergreen model is about people determining 
together whether they give themselves a raise, how much goes into their pocket today and 
how much goes for the future."); About, EVERGREEN COOPERATIVE LAUNDRY, available at 
http://evergreencooperatives.com/business/evergreen-laundry/about/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2014) (the Evergreen Cooperative Laundry web site introduces its CEO, apparently 
appointed by the ECC, followed by a brief mention of the "worker-owners," described as 
the "heart of the company"). 
186. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 8, 11-12 (publishing the lending 
arrangements as well as providing information concerning the actual and projected 
performance of each cooperative). 
187. See id. at 4. 
188. The novelty of democratic enterprises of scale has attracted considerable attention, 
including a prominent place in the documentary SHIFT CHANGE (Moving Images 2012), in 
Now: Fixing the Future (PBS broadcast Nov. 17, 2010) and Al-Jazeera, Fault Lines: 
Working through the US Jobs Crisis (Aug. 29, 2010), available at, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/faultlines/2010/04/2010481251991166.html (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
189. SHIFT CHANGE (Moving Images 2012) in Now: Fixing the Future (PBS broadcast 
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V. THE MIETHAUSER SYNDIKAT MODEL 
A. History and Development 
Germany's post-war history has been plagued by housing 
shortages of varying urgency. 190 Starting in the 1960s, residential 
buildings in large numbers were occupied by squatters, both to secure 
living space and to protest the inflation of living costs through real 
estate speculation. 191 The occupation of many of these buildings 
continues today, some 'legitimized' by purchase or alternative means, 192 
while others are still the focus of intense struggles. 193 Many of the 
individual housing projects now organized in the Mietshauser Syndikat 
were former "squat houses" that had persisted for years or even decades 
in organizational isolation. 194 
Nov. 17, 2010). 
190. See FED. RESEARCH DIVIS., GERMANY: A COUNTRY STUDY (Eric Solsten ed., 1996) 
available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.390 l 5039072544;view= 1 up;seq= 1 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2014) ("Housing" chapter). 
191. See generally Klaus Pokatzky, "Noch vie/ mehr Polizei!", DIE ZEIT (Oct. 18, 
1985), archived version available at http://www.zeit.de/l 985/43/noch-viel-mehr-
polizei/seite-l (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (describing the tensions in the city ofFreiburg in 
connection with several housing projects, which served as a nexus for the student left and 
the punk scene). The fall of the Berlin Wall led to the reunification of the city and spread 
the squatters' movement from west to east, where East Berliners sought both political 
change and resisted the incursion of West German investors. See Geschichte - Die 
Hausbesetzerlnnenbewegung in Ost-Berlin, Teil l, SQUATTER, available at 
http://www.squatter.w3brigade.de/content/geschichte/die-hausbesetzerbewegung-ost-berlin-
teill (last visited on Nov. 16, 2014). 
192. One example is the "Pferdestall" in Frankfurt am Main, now a community center. 
See AKTIONSGEMEINSCHAFT WESTEND E.V., available at http://www.aktionsgemeinschaft-
westend.de/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
193. One such 'hot-spot' is the Rote Flora house in Hamburg, whose legal owner 
threatened to finally clear the house of squatters after decades of occupation. See Jorg 
Ziercke, BKA-Chefwarnt vor Gewalteskalationen wie in Hamburg, DIE ZEIT (Jan. 23, 2014, 
18: 12), available at http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-01/hamburg-krawalle-bka-
chef-wamung-gewaltspirale (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). This in tum led to considerable 
social unrest in late 2013 and early 2014, including street battles between Hamburg police 
and demonstrators. See Kersten Augustin, Mit dem Fingerspitzengefiihl eines 
Polizeiknuppels, DIE ZEIT (Jan. 14, 2014, 15:43), available at 
http://www.zeit.de/ gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2014-01 I gefahrengebiet-hamburg-kommentar 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (opinion piece condemning the mayor of Hamburg's policing 
policies as having "the tact of a billy club"). At the time of writing the Rote Flora's fate 
remained uncertain. See Christoph Twickel & Marc Widmann, "Wir machen das ": Die 
Rote Flora gehohrt jetzt der Lawaetz-Stiftung; Was hat sie damit vor?, DIE ZEIT (November 
6, 2014, 12:00) available at http://www.zeit.de/2014/46/rote-flora-lawaetz-stiftung (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2014) (describing the purchase of the property by a third party that hopes to 
mediate between the activists and the city). 
194. See Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/de/projekte/linie206/ (last visited Dec. 17 2014) (description of a 
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The Mietshauser Syndikat was founded in Freiburg in 1992. 195 
The Syndikat was the product of efforts by members of the "Grether" 
housing project, a former metal foundry that was converted into housing 
units in 1988 and became the Syndikat's first member project. 196 The 
aim of the founders, as stated by one member, was to capitalize on the 
success of the Grether Project to finance similar efforts and use the 
members' collective experience to aid such projects. 197 The Syndikat's 
goal is to help groups obtain affordable housing outside the 
conventional tenancy relationship. 198 The Syndikat's guiding principles 
are self-organization, solidarity, and the "neutralization of property," i.e. 
freeing residential property from speculative influence. 199 
Starting in the mid-1990s, the Mietshauser Syndikat aided in the 
foundation of several housing projects, which continues at the steady 
pace of about one to three new projects a year. 200 At present there are 
eighty-four projects and twenty-eight initiatives in development.201 
While some of the member projects pre-date the Syndikat, the vast 
majority of the projects were founded with the Syndikat' s assistance. 202 
Out of all the initiatives organized in cooperation with the Syndikat only 
a handful have failed, twice due to being outbid by another prospective 
purchaser of a building and once because the owner of a building 
refused to sell to the Syndikat. 203 Three other initiatives have 
voluntarily dissolved without ever attempting to purchase a building. 204 
Of the completed projects only one has ever experienced insolvency. 205 
Berlin project originally occupied by squatters in 1990). 
195. MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, Presentation in Barcelona, Spain: Das Mietshiiuser-
Syndikat - The Tenement Syndicate at Slide 7 (July 7, 2013) [hereinafter Presentation] 
(unpublished PowerPoint, on file with author) (power point presentation delivered by 
members of the Syndikat in July of 2013 to potential member-investors in a project in 
Barcelona, Spain). 
196. ARD Ratgeber Bauen + Wohnen (ARD television broadcast May 10, 2009). 
197. Id. (the Grether Project members found it important to "provid[e] know-how to 
other projects so that they wouldn't have to re-invent the wheel"). 
198. ALTOTTINGER MIETER KONVENT E.V., Flyer: Wohnen geht auch anders! (2009) 
(unpublished tlyer)(on file with author) [hereinafter AMK Flyer] ("We would like to 
establish self-determined and self-organized free spaces for all residents and thereby 
dissolve traditional power relations between renters and lessors."). 
199. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 12-13. 
200. Presentation, supra note 195, slide 7. 
201. Standortkarte, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 7 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) 
(increase of three new projects over the prior year). 
202. See Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 194. 
203. See Chronik, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/chronik/ (last visited on Nov. 16, 2014). 
204. See id. 
205. See id. (the project in question was the "Eilhardshof' Project in Neustadt-an-der-
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There are now nearly 2,000 residents living within almost 60,000 square 
meters of living space in Syndikat projects. 206 Since its inception the 
Syndikat has invested over €60,000,000 in housing projects.207 
1. Organization and Structure 
The Mietshauser Syndikat represents a formal, hierarchical 
constellation of several entities. 208 At the apex stands the non-profit 
Mietshauser Syndikat Association (hereinafter "Syndikat 
Association"),209 which is the sole proprietor of the Mietshauser 
Syndikat LLC (hereinafter "Syndikat LLC"),210 the entity that manages 
the finances related to the various projects and assists in their formation 
and administration.211 The Syndikat LLC is in tum a forty-nine percent 
stakeholder in each individual project's LLC, with the local non-profit 
"Residents' Association"212 controlling the remainder.213 However, the 
Residents' Associations also become members of the Syndikat 
Association, resulting in a constitutive feedback loop unique among the 
entities discussed here.214 Beyond guaranteeing the residents a seat at 
the table of their local LLC they are offered control over the entire 
Syndikat organization through their Association, ensuring that no 
decisions are made over their heads. 215 
Also notable is that the Syndikat' s individual project entities are 
not cooperatives but LLCs.216 The founders of the Mietshauser 
Syndikat initially intended to use cooperatives.217 They discovered, 
WeinstraBe ). 
206. Linie 206, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 194. 
207. Presentation, supra note 195, slide 9. 
208. An excellent organizational chart is available on the Mietshauser Syndikat 
website. See The Joint Venture, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/joint_ venture/ (last visited on Dec. 17, 2014). 
209. Id. (German: "Mietshauser Syndikat e.V."). 
210. Id. (German: "Mietshauser Syndikat GmbH"). 
211. Id.; see also AMK Flyer, supra note 198 ( explaining the role of the Syndikat in 
the AMK project). 
212. The Joint Venture, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, supra note 208 (German: 
"Hausverein"). 
213. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 14-15; AMK Flyer, supra note 198 
(explaining that in any project the Syndikat and Residents' Association are the sole owners 
of the LLC that formally owns a given property and that each has a single, equal vote). 
214. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29 (membership qualifications of the 
Syndikat Association); see id. at 30 (copy of the Syndikat Gmbh's charter, listing the 
Syndikat Association as the sole interest holder); see Presentation, supra note 195, slide 14-
15. 
215. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29. 
216. See id. at 29. 
217. See Die Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschaft, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, 
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however, that there would be almost no effective way to bind a series of 
individual housing cooperatives together. 218 At the same time, a single 
large-scale cooperative encompassing all the housing projects would be 
unwieldy and severely limit the autonomy of the individual projects. 219 
This prompted the use of LLCs, which provided control to prevent sale 
of the properties while also being flexible enough to permit democratic 
management. 220 
2. On the Ground: The Project LLCs and Residents' Associations 
The first step for those seeking to found a new housing project or 
associate an existing one with the Syndikat is to form a non-profit 
association. 221 Once the formalities for the association are complete, 222 
the new Residents' Association may apply to the Syndikat Association 
for membership and to the Syndikat LLC for practical assistance. 223 
Once approved by the Members' Assembly224 of the Syndikat 
Association, the Residents' Association is granted membership and the 
process of founding the housing project LLC begins. 225 The Syndikat 
LLC acquires a forty-nine percent interest and while the Residents' 
Association is technically the majority interest-holder, the operating 
agreement of each LLC provides that the Syndikat LLC enjoys absolute 
voting parity with the Residents' Association on questions of alienation 
of the property or its privatization. 226 In this way the Syndikat may 
available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. 
221. Civil Code§§ 21-22 (Ger.). 
222. For registered associations this requires the presentation of the charter and some 
other documentation to a local court agency (German: Amtsgericht). Id. 
223. See MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014); see also HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29, 32-34 (explaining the conditions and 
advantages of membership in the Syndikat Association, as well as offering an example of a 
cost-sharing agreement between the Syndikat LLC and one of the House Project LLCs). 
The Members' Assembly of the Syndikat Association decides on the admission of all 
members. HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29. 
224. HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 10, 29 (German: "Mitgliedversammlung"). 
225. Id. 
226. Presentation, supra note 195, slides 14-15; AMK Flyer, supra note 198; 
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28. Other requirements concern non-discrimination policies 
in the acceptance of new resident members and the adoption of transparent accounting 
practices and democratic governance. Lending agreements include separate, further controls 
related to the repayment of loans but terminate once these debts are satisfied. See 
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28, 32-34. Although further requirements are not formally 
included in the individual project agreements, the Members' Assembly of the Syndikat 
Association is able to engage in a process of selection: while it affirms the need for diversity 
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ensure that the Residents' Association does not subvert the original 
purpose of the project. 227 Beyond these fundamental concerns, 
however, the Syndikat LLC has no role in an individual housing 
project's daily affairs. 228 As a result, all decisions concerning house 
rules, maintenance, renovations or any other house-specific activities 
are left entirely to the discretion of the residents themselves. 229 
After the formation of the project LLC, that entity and the Syndikat 
LLC sign a "Cost-Sharing Agreement"230, which is virtually identical 
for all projects and obligates the project LLC to pay a progressively 
increasing "Solidarity Transfer"231 to the Syndikat LLC. 232 This 
payment begins at ten Eurocents per square meter of living space per 
month.233 It rises by 5% per year from the previous year, a pace 
calculated to ensure continued funding for the Syndikat LLC's activities 
but low enough to give individual projects the time needed to pay down 
debts incurred at foundation, usually scheduled for a forty year 
period.234 However, an absolute maximum for the Solidarity Transfer is 
set at 80% of the local average rent, ensuring both that established 
housing projects are not unduly burdened to the benefit of newer 
projects and that the projects can all continue to offer affordable 
in living arrangements, "this does not mean that there are no limits." Das Syndikat in 
Betrieb, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16 
2014). The Members' Assembly decides on the acceptance of each individual project, 
whereby some may be "totally rejected," such as commercial projects, "anti-emancipatory 
projects of a cult or, even more extreme, that of a Neonazi group." Id. 
227. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28, 32-34. 
228. See Die Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); AMK Flyer, supra note 198 ("In all other 
affairs the Residents' Association generally has the sole say: Who moves in? How will we 
renovate? How high will the rent be? The decisions and their execution belong solely to 
those who live in the house."). 
229. The 51 % share of the local association in the project LLC provides sufficient 
interest to allow for local control. This simplifies the operating agreement, which provides 
for special voting rules on the questions described above but by default leaves all other 
decisions in the hands of the local association. Die Verbundbausteine, MIETSHAUSER-
SYNDIKAT, available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Flyer, supra note 
198. 
230. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 34-35 (German: "Vereinbarung zur 
Kostenbeteiligung"). 
231. Id. (German: "Solidartransfer"). 
232. See id. (copying an actual Cost-Sharing Agreement between the Syndikat LLC 
and the Templerhaus LLC, a project in Weinheim, Germany). 
233. See id. 
234. See id.; see Presentation, supra note 195, slide 20 (graphically representing a 
typical payment scheme, where the contributions to the "Solidarity Fund" increases as the 
payments for financing debt decreases); see Solidarfonds, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, 
available at www.syndikat.org (last visited Nov. 16 2014). 
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housing.235 As consideration for this payment, the Syndikat LLC aids 
the local project in its development, including acquisition of financing, 
community fund-raising, advertising and questions of tax and corporate 
law. 236 
3. The Big Picture: The Mietshiiuser Syndikat e. V. & Mietshiiuser 
Syndikat Gmbh 
The Syndikat Association is governed by the Members' 
Assembly.237 The Members' Assembly has two main functions: first, to 
appoint and oversee the officers of the Syndikat LLC; second, to decide 
which projects to take on and accept as members of the Syndikat 
Association. 238 Each member has an equal vote and while members are 
encouraged to invest beyond the minimum amount, additional 
investment does not increase voting power. 239 
The Syndikat LLC's primary function is to advise new and 
continuing projects on subjects as varied as finance management, 
repayment of debts, tax law and possible strategies for improving their 
buildings.240 The LLC also administers the "Solidarity Fund," out of 
which the individual project LLCs are capitalized. 241 The Syndikat 
Association's Board of Directors, elected by the Members' Assembly, 
oversees the Syndikat LLC's day-to-day activities.242 
It is worth noting that there are no paid positions in the Syndikat 
LLC and most consulting is conducted on a pro bono basis by members 
of existing projects with specialized knowledge or experience. 243 
235. The relevant statistics, "Mietspiegel" in German, are produced by local municipal 
and state governments and contain comprehensive rent rate information. See Mietspiegel, 
SENATSVERWALTUNG FOR STADTENTWICKLUNG UND UMWELT, available at 
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/wohnen/mietspiegel/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
236. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 34-35. 
237. See id. at 29-30 (the Members' Assembly operating on the basis of a democratic 
consensus-building). 
238. See id. at 28-30; Skype Interview with Marcel Seehuber, Member, AMK e.V. , 
Mietshauser-Syndikat (Nov. 2, 2013) (membership is also open to individuals and other 
organizations, which helps in engaging local residents or community groups in the 
development process; current members must vote to confer membership, which is a 
prerequisite for the Syndikat's assistance); see also HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29. 
239. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28-29; Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra 
note 238. 
240. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 32-33. 
241. See id. (German: "Solidarfonds"). 
242. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/operation/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (outlining 
the role of the LLC in relation to the Syndikat Association). 
243. See id. ("[T]he counseling and supervision of a house initiative be provided free of 
charge by committed volunteers from existing projects."). 
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Regular workshops and information exchanges take place at the same 
time as the meetings of the Members' Assembly, furthering this 'do-it-
yourself ethos. 244 
B. Applicability and Advantages of the Mietshauser Syndikat Model 
The Mietshauser-Syndikat's model offers considerable advantages 
in the development of workers' cooperatives outside of Germany. The 
Syndikat model is not dependent upon any peculiarities of German law, 
but is almost fully transferable to any jurisdiction that provides for 
LLC-type entities.245 Although differences exist between the operations 
of housing cooperatives and workers' cooperatives, these do not 
undermine the inherent strength and resilience of the Syndikat model, 
which can be adapted to the particular needs of these enterprises. 
Finally, this organizational format is the best for fostering workplace 
democracy and democratic economic development, an oft-touted ideal 
of the cooperative movement at large and rhetorically prominent in the 
self-representations of the Mondragon and Evergreen cooperatives.246 
The following discussion sketches how a Syndikat-type network of 
workers' cooperatives could be formed and organized in civil law 
(Spain) and common law (the United States) jurisdictions to promote 
effective and democratic economic development. 
1. Applicability to Workers' Cooperatives 
The Mietshauser-Syndikat's purpose is to expand affordable, 
quality housing and neither it nor its member organizations engage in 
manufacturing or provide services.247 Nevertheless, with slight 
modification this model would lend itself well to the development of 
244. See id. (the Members' Assembly "[i]s always scheduled on a weekend, leaving 
room for the exchange of information, counseling, workshops, mutual help and the 
opportunity to meet people from other projects."). 
245. See generally Lenhardt, supra note 15, at 551-52; see Larry E. Ribstein, A 
Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311, 314-15 (1995) 
(noting the near universality of the LLC in the U.S. as of the mid-l 990s ); see THE LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY CENTER, available at http://www.limitedliabilitycompanycenter.com/ 
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (providing a brief history of the development of LLCs in all 50 
states). 
246. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 14-16, 30, 33 (relating Mondragon 
founder Arizmendiarrieta' s commitment to democracy and insistence on worker 
empowerment); see EVERGREEN COOPERATIVES, Evergreen Businesses, available at 
http://evergreencooperatives.com/businesses/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (including an 
explicit endorsement of increased democracy in the workplace). 
24 7. In fact, beyond the initial capitalization of the individual project LLCs, the 
Mietshauser-Syndikat does not provide any financing at all, even for housing projects. See 
HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28. 
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both individual worker-managed enterprises and a network of such 
entities. 
The primary difference between the Mietshauser Syndikat and a 
hypothetical "Worker Cooperative Network" (termed "Co-op Network" 
for convenience) would be one of focus: instead of acquiring capital for 
the purchase of real estate, the network would raise funds to found 
enterprises and instead of examining the feasibility of purchasing or 
converting a building, the network would assess the prospects and 
sustainability of a proposed enterprise. 248 A parallel entity to the 
Syndikat LLC would aid in the organization and financing of worker 
cooperatives. 249 The individual enterprises would be members in the 
Co-op Network's executive non-profit entity, where a Members' 
Assembly would elect the non-profit's board, appoint the Co-op 
Network LLC directors and oversee its activities. 250 The individual 
enterprises would still enjoy considerable autonomy in day-to-day 
operations, but the Co-op Network's LLC would possess an interest 
sufficient to prevent sale or conversion of the enterprise into a 
"conventional" business. 251 
2. Transferring the Mietshiiuser Syndikat Model to Other Jurisdictions 
To ease administration by the Members' Assembly, an umbrella 
non-profit entity with full control of the Co-op Network's LLC is 
essential.252 The Co-op Network LLC would then share ownership of 
the individual enterprises with their worker-owners.253 In many 
jurisdictions, the for-profit nature of the individual enterprises may 
248. The Mietshauser Syndikat engages in such vetting and planning in all its housing 
projects, often working with residents through a long process of project development. See 
Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242. 
249. In this respect, certain comparisons could be drawn between the roles of 
Mondragon's Caja Laboral and the Syndikat LLC. See AxwoRTHY, supra note 66, at 5; 
WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 69; Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242. 
250. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, Organigramm, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available 
at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/operation/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (the 
Organigramm page flow chart is probably the clearest depiction of the constitutive nature of 
the Syndikat). 
251. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28 (among the conditions set for the Syndikat's 
assistance is "the exclusion of any private property interest in the building"). It should be 
noted that while the Syndikat possesses a little less than a half-interest in each project LLC, 
the principle of voting parity on issues of sale or privatization rests in the LLC's formation 
agreement itself, allowing the Syndikat greater control than its proportional interest would 
otherwise allow. See Die Finanzierung, MtETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/funding/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
252. See Das Syndikat in Betrieb, supra note 242. 
253. See id. 
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preclude formation of a non-profit entity that would represent the 
worker-owners in both the individual LLC and the Members' 
Assembly. 254 This is not an insurmountable hurdle, however: on the 
ground level, voting parity with the Co-op Network LLC can be 
achieved through the enterprise LLC 's operating agreement255 and the 
executive non-profit's by-laws can facilitate representation by the 
worker-owners. 256 
In the U.S., there are a few types of entities that would be 
compatible with the democratic decision-making process of the 
Mietshauser-Syndikat.257 One option would be the Benefit Corporation, 
which would permit the Co-op Network to pursue socially-driven 
economic development while founding essentially for-profit 
enterprises. 258 The Members' Assembly would consist of shareholders 
in the Benefit Corporation, whose articles of incorporation would 
govern both membership and the decision-making process, preserving 
the constitutive qualities of the Syndikat Association.259 However, a 
central component of the Syndikat model is absolute voting parity 
within the Members' Assembly, which may be difficult to maintain in 
an entity where votes are formally tied to shares. 260 This would require 
254. See id.; Non-Profit Entities Law, B.O.E. n. 307 art. 3(6) (Spain), available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014). 
255. See generally UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT§§ 201, 405, 407 (1994) (amended 2006), 
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/limited%20liability°/o20company/ullca_final_06rev.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2014). 
256. 26 U.S.C § 503 (2014). 
257. As detailed above, the highest organ in the Mietshauser Syndikat is a registered 
association, a non-profit organization. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (reproduction 
of the Syndikat Association's articles of incorporation). 
258. See Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A 
Primer on Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for 
the Benefit Corporation, 4 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 639, 697-701 (2013) (offering a good 
overview of the characteristics of the Benefit Corporation as compared to other American 
and European social enterprise entities) [hereinafter "Social Enterprise Revolution"]; cf 
Anne E. Conaway, What we can Learn from Other Statutory Schemes: Lessons to be 
Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contract in Delaware's Alternative Entity Law 
Might Inform Delaware's General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 792-93 
(2012) ( detailing the characteristics of the "B Corporation," which is privately certified and 
regulated by the non-profit B Labs) [hereinafter "Conaway, Alternative Entity Law"]; see 
also, Ann E. Conaway, The Global Use of the Delaware Limited Liability Company for 
Socially-Driven Purposes, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 772, 773, 779 (2012) (suggesting 
utilizing hybrid-purpose LLCs for the pursuit of both profit and social benefit in Great 
Britain). 
259. See Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 697-98. 
260. Each member, whether a Syndikat-sponsored project, a community organization 
or a natural person, receives only one vote, with no possibility for the acquisition of more. 
See Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra note 238; HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 14; 
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some mechanism by which large numbers of shares are held in reserve 
for distribution to new members or which proportionally reduces 
existing member shares with each addition. 261 Also, Benefit 
Corporations are very new entities whose contours and duties have not 
yet been tested by courts or extensive real-world practice: to date, only 
thirteen U.S. states have passed statutes permitting Benefit 
Corporations. 262 
A 'tried-and-true' entity may be preferable to experimenting with a 
new one and forming a 501(c) non-profit presents itself as the safer 
option.263 One potential hurdle would be that the Co-op Network non-
profit would, through its LLC, have an interest in profit-generating 
enterprises.264 However, I.R.C. § 50l(c) includes a wide array of 
organizations and sets as its primary requirement that any entity 
organized under its aegis neither seek private profit nor distribute any to 
private shareholders.265 A 501(c)(6) "business league" formed in the 
U.S. along the lines of the Mietshauser Syndikat would almost certainly 
meet these criteria.266 Either a Benefit Corporation or a 501(c)(6), 
properly organized or approved by the IRS, 267 would avoid potential 
regulatory issues and permit democratic governance. 268 
In Spain, by contrast, the Syndikat Association could be 
reproduced on an almost one-to-one basis.269 Spanish non-profit 
Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 696-97 (describing the structure and legal 
requirements for Benefit Corporations). 
261. See Social Enterprise Revolution, supra note 258, at 696-97. 
262. See id. at 697. 
263. See 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (2010). 
264. By comparison, all the projects of the Mietshauser Syndikat seek no profit but 
instead benefits for their resident members. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28. 
265. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (2010) (permitting the organization of tax-exempt 
"[b ]usiness leagues, chambers of commerce ... [ and] boards of trade ... not organized for 
profit and no part of the net earnings of which insures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual."). 
266. The members of the Mietshauser Syndikat e.V. receive no profits or dividends 
whatsoever and because the Syndikat does not finance projects but instead merely 
capitalizes the initial project LLCs, there is also no possibility of indirectly profiting through 
decisions of the Members' Assembly. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 28. 
267. A 50l(c) organization must file IRS Form 1023 to acquire recognition as a tax-
exempt entity. See Form 1023, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/fl 023. pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014 ). 
268. See 26 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2011) (identifying "prohibited transactions" that would 
serve as grounds for denial of exemption); Conaway, supra note 258, at 792-93 (describing 
the "triple bottom-line" purpose ofB Corporations). 
269. See Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a 
Comparative Approach to Reforming the US. International Tax Regime, 35 V AND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 1105, 1210-11 (2002) (summarizing the requirements for non-profit 
associations in Spain); Non-Profit Entities Law, Exposition of Motives II (B.O.E. 2002, 49) 
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associations are permitted to own interests in other entities, so long as 
they do not pass on any proceeds to private persons. 270 Spanish law 
would also permit the democratic organization of an association and 
membership criteria like those of the Mietshauser Syndikat.271 The 
second-degree cooperative groups provided for under Spanish law could 
in principle unify the functions of the Syndikat Association and LLC. 272 
However, the Cooperative Law mandates a structure that lacks both the 
same democratic character that the Syndikat model offers and adequate 
safeguards against alienation. 273 Cooperative groups are defined as 
having a "head entity that exercises authority or communicates 
instructions that are binding on the grouped cooperatives,"274 while 
having only limited means to prevent members from leaving the 
organization. 275 As such, to acquire the advantages of the Mietshauser 
Syndikat model in civil law jurisdictions it would be best to parallel the 
Syndikat structure as closely as possible rather than attempt to adapt 
local cooperative forms. 
As noted above, one of the unique aspects of the Mietshauser 
Syndikat is its status as a network organized in the "cooperative spirit" 
which has declined to use the cooperative form in favor of 
democratically-structured LLCs. 276 In jurisdictions where business 
entities may become members of cooperatives and can acquire an 
interest sufficient to prevent the sale or conversion of the enterprise, one 
could use the cooperative form without giving up any of the advantages 
(Spain), available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/l 2/24/pdfs/ A45229-45243 .pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2014) (permitting non-profit entities to "freely acquire interests in 
commercial enterprises" and including non-profits that "promote the social economy," 
respectively); Civil Code§ 21-22 (Ger.). 
270. Non-Profit Entities Law art. 3(6) (B.O.E. 2002, 49) (Spain) available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/12/24/pdfs/A45229-45243.pdf(last visited Nov. 16, 2014) 
(prohibiting even the reversion of assets to a founder or their heirs in the event of the non-
profit's dissolution). 
271. Organizational Law art. 2(5) (B.O.E. 2002, 1) (Spain), available at 
https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/03/26/pdfs/Al 1981-11991.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014) ("The internal organization of associations ... shall be democratic."). 
272. Cooperative Law arts. 77-78 (Spain). 
273. Id. 
274. Id. art. 78(1 ). 
275. Id. arts. 17, 77(6) (providing that member cooperatives in a second-degree 
cooperative enjoy all the same rights as members of a first-degree cooperative, which under 
Article 1 7 includes the right to leave the cooperative at any time, limited only by the 
cooperative's right to demand notice ofup to one year). 
276. See Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschafi, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, 
available at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/building_blocks/ (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014). 
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of the Syndikat model.277 However, where such an arrangement is not 
legally possible278 or carries significant regulatory burdens, 279 aligning 
individual enterprises in LLCs using the Mietshauser Syndikat model 
would open the way to the development of democratic enterprises of 
scale.280 
In the U.S., some states limit membership and ownership interest 
in a cooperative to persons employed by the cooperative, precluding any 
permanent ownership interest by the Co-op Network. 281 Because such 
an ownership interest is the simplest and most effective way for our 
hypothetical Co-op Network to ensure that a democratic enterprise is 
not later sold or converted into a standard business, the use of LLCs 
would be required.282 Fortunately, founders of LLCs enjoy great 
latitude in crafting operating agreements, such that provisions for 
democratic governance and safeguards against sale or conversion may 
be inserted easily. 283 
In Spain, by contrast, mixed membership cooperatives are possible, 
meaning that a Co-op Network could be a member in a cooperative 
alongside natural persons.284 However, no cooperative member is 
permitted to control more than 30% of the votes. 285 As such, a 
Syndikat-style Co-op Network LLC would lack sufficient voting power 
to prevent the sale or conversion of individual cooperatives. 286 Spanish 
277. The "second-degree cooperative" in Spain leaves open such a possibility, albeit 
with the issues described in this section. Cooperative Law arts. 77-78 (Spain). 
278. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 157A, § 6 (West 2014) ("No person may be 
accepted as a member unless employed by the employee cooperative." "An employee 
cooperative shall issue a class of voting stock [ and] [ e ]ach member shall own only one such 
membership share, and only members may own such shares."). 
279. See Verbundbausteine - Keine Genossenschaft, MIETSHAUSER-SYNDIKAT, 
available at http://www.syndikat.org/en/syndikat_en/building_blocks/ (last visited Nov. 16, 
2014) (another reason the Syndikat rejected the cooperative as an entity was because 
operations were made more difficult by the "continuous reporting requirements" of the 
Cooperative Auditing Association). 
280. See Chronik, MIETSHAUSER SYNDIKAT, available at 
http://www.syndikat.org/de/syndikat/chronik/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (a timeline 
detailing the rapid growth of the Syndikat in the last two decades). 
281. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 157A, § 6 (West 2014). 
282. Id. 
283. UNIFORM LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 110 (1994) (1994)(amended 2006), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/limited%20liability<>lo20company/ullca _final_ 06re 
v.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
284. Cooperative Law art. 12 (Spain). 
285. Id. art. 26. 
286. Id. art. 64(2) (under the law a two-thirds majority is prescribed for transforming a 
cooperative enterprise or merging it with another cooperative enterprise and this cannot be 
changed in the by-laws). 
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LLCs, like U.S. LLCs, offer great latitude in determining the decision-
making process.287 As such, the LLC recommends itself as a format 
flexible enough to allow for hard-wiring democratic governance into an 
enterprise while still permitting the necessary degree of control on the 
part of the Co-op Network as parent LLC.288 
3. Advantages over the Mondragon and Evergreen Models 
The advantages of the Miethauser Syndikat over the Mondragon 
Corporation and the Evergreen Cooperative Corporation are two-fold. 
First, the Syndikat model represents a more thoroughly democratic 
approach to enterprise development and management than either 
Mondragon or the ECC. Second, the Syndikat's development process is 
highly sustainable, in part due to the fact that its democratic structure is 
eminently suited to stable, organic growth. 
While the Mondragon Corporation is regularly cited as the greatest 
success story in the history of cooperatives, it is not without flaws. 289 
The essentially top-down management structure, with the Caja Laboral 
as the unofficial apex entity, casts serious doubt on the paeans praising 
Mondragon as a ready-made template for economic democracy. 290 As 
members of the Mondragon Caja themselves have often admitted, 
Mondragon is an otherwise conventional business that happens to 
consist of cooperatives.291 Mondragon's recent history of investing in 
businesses that do not offer membership to employees also feeds the 
suspicion that, in order to generate profits, Mondragon is ready, willing 
and able to engage in the same practices that its proponents find so 
objectionable about "conventional" businesses. 292 
The Evergreen Cooperative Corporation, explicitly modeled on the 
Mondragon Corporation, has done nothing to address these issues. 293 
Indeed, its management structure is even more technocratic than that of 
Mondragon and it remains uncertain at this early stage what degree of 
287. Id. art. 125. 
288. Id. 
289. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 11. 
290. See id. at 7; see generally WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 296-97. 
291. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 7. 
292. See FAQs, MONDRAGON CORPORATION, available at http://www.mondragon-
corporation.com/eng/co-operative-experience/faqs/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (noting at 
least one program under which a significant number of non-members are to be 
enfranchised); Contradictions in Paradise, WORKERS' PARADISE (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:00 AM), 
available at http://www.cooperativeconsult.com/blog/?p=490 (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) 
( discussing a strike over low wages and poor working conditions by workers at a 
Mondragon-owned factory in Poland). 
293. See Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 3, 5. 
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autonomy the individual cooperatives will enjoy and how constitutive 
the ECC's executive organ will become.294 As the project is still in its 
infancy, one could excuse the current technocratic methods as necessary 
expediencies on the path to a more democratic future. 295 If it persists in 
the same vein as present, however, the sponsoring "anchor enterprises" 
will dominate the ECC at the highest level, with cooperative members 
wielding little control over its future. 296 
The Mietshauser Syndikat model addresses such eventualities 
through an absolute institutional commitment to democratic decision-
making and mandatory admission of member projects in the governing 
Members' Assembly.297 Although allowed significant autonomy, the 
individual projects would have to extend membership to all 
constituents, who would have representation in the Members' 
Assembly. 298 The operating agreements of the project LLCs would 
enable the Co-op Network LLC to check any effort to sell or convert a 
project.299 Similarly, it is unlikely that a proposal to invest in 
'conventional' enterprises, i.e. ones that would not become members, 
would find sufficient support in the Members' Assembly. 300 Even if it 
did, the by-laws of the Co-op Network non-profit can be crafted to 
preclude such an outcome.301 
One could make the argument that the undemocratic aspects of 
both Mondragon and the ECC merely reflect the economic necessity of 
speedy, centralized decision-making without which these enterprises 
would fail. 302 This argument bears a striking resemblance to a common 
argument against cooperatives in general: too much democracy 
paralyzes decision-making and hobbles a business. 303 This latter 
position has been sufficiently disproved by the success of Mondragon 
cooperatives, which operate on a largely democratic basis in their day-
to-day operations. 304 In fact, enhancing democratic structures can 
294. See id. at 14. 
295. See generally id. 
296. See id. at 5, 14. 
297. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (describing membership policies and 
identifying the Members' Association as the executive body). 
298. See id. at 28. 
299. See id. at 14 (§ 5 of the sample LLC operating agreement). 
300. See id. at 28. 
301. See HANDBUCH, supra note 44, at 29 (If the "purpose of the association is 
fundamentally altered, the assets [thereof] must be used for the original purpose," 
administered by a trustee). 
302. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6-7. 
303. See WHYTE & WHYTE, supra note 59, at 3. 
304. See id. at 3-4. 
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actually stimulate and ensure sustainable growth, improving the stability 
of a Co-op Network as a whole. 
The Mondragon Corporation has experienced severe contractions 
in the course of its history, when cooperatives were forced to merge or 
failed entirely. 305 The Caja Laboral's policy of developing cooperatives 
with an eye toward existing enterprises' supply and service needs has 
had positive synergistic effects but left Mondragon as a whole 
susceptible to chain reactions of bankruptcies. 306 The concentration of 
power in the hands of the Caja Laboral also means that business 
development draws not on the wide base of experience and knowledge 
of its members, but instead solely on that of a small number of 
conventionally-trained technocrats. 307 
Likewise, the central ECC non-profit is in full control of all 
business development. 308 While this institution's members certainly 
possess expertise that is essential to developing new cooperatives, this 
model could also foster a degree of group-think. 309 One way to avoid 
this outcome is to increase the knowledge and experience base of the 
decision makers, which can be achieved by allowing for the 
participation of all cooperative members. 
The Members' Assembly of the Mietshauser Syndikat makes all 
decisions concerning the acceptance of new projects, although the 
implementation of that decision is delegated to the Syndikat LLC. Far 
from hampering growth, the Mietshauser Syndikat continues to accept 
new projects on a yearly basis. More importantly, all but one of the 
projects developed in cooperation with the Syndikat have been 
successful, a truly remarkable record of sustainability and stability. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article is not to deny the success of the 
Mondragon Corporation or to deride the efforts of the Evergreen 
Cooperative Corporation, as each represent an inspiring success story 
and a welcome initiative in the history of cooperative economic 
development. Rather, the concerns and issues surrounding those two 
305. See id. at 177-78, 188-89. 
306. See id. at 47, 177-78. 
307. See Axworthy, supra note 66, at 6-7. 
308. Evergreen Field Study, supra note 9, at 14 (the Evergreen Cooperative 
Development Fund and Business Services LLC are also involved but are entirely controlled 
by the ECC non-profit). 
309. See id. 
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enterprises are pointed out to illustrate that the goal of promoting 
democratic economic development may be hampered and not helped by 
the use of non-democratic methods. The Mietshauser Syndikat 
demonstrates that it is possible to develop democratic enterprises, 
organize them in a network and ensure sustained growth of both 
enterprise and network utilizing exclusively democratic structures, 
without resort to the top-down organizational schemes of conventional 
businesses. In pursuing a more prosperous, equitable and democratic 
economy, the means are inseparable from the ends and the Mietshauser 
Syndikat represents a model in both methods and results. 
Moreover, the Mietshauser Syndikat's structure, a constellation of 
LLCs under the umbrella of a non-profit governing entity, can be 
replicated in both civil and common-law jurisdictions. As such it 
should be possible to re-purpose the Mietshauser Syndikat's model for 
worker-managed enterprises and to repeat its success across the globe. 
Indeed, the Mietshauser Syndikat itself is beginning to venture outside 
the borders of Germany and develop projects in other European 
countries.310 As those efforts will surely show, the day of international 
networks of democratic enterprises is approaching and with it a more 
prosperous future. 
310. Interview with Marcel Seehuber, supra note 238; Presentation, supra note 195, 
Slide 17. 
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